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Abstract
The apparent nonlocality of quantum theory has been a persistent concern. Einstein et.
al. (1935) and Bell (1964) emphasized the apparent nonlocality arising from entanglement
correlations. While some interpretations embrace this nonlocality, modern variations of
the Everett-inspired many worlds interpretation try to circumvent it. In this paper, we
review Bell’s “no-go” theorem and explain how it rests on three axioms, local causality, no
superdeterminism, and one world. Although Bell is often taken to have shown that local
causality is ruled out by the experimentally confirmed entanglement correlations, we make
clear that it is the conjunction of the three axioms that is ruled out by these correlations.
We then show that by assuming local causality and no superdeterminism, we can give a
direct proof of many worlds. The remainder of the paper searches for a consistent, local,
formulation of many worlds. We show that prominent formulations whose ontology is given
by the wave function violate local causality, and we critically evaluate claims in the literature
to the contrary. We ultimately identify a local many worlds interpretation that replaces the
wave function with a separable Lorentz-invariant wave-field. We conclude with discussions
of the Born rule, and other interpretations of quantum mechanics.
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1 Introduction
In the early days of quantum theory, many physicists and philosophers were troubled by the
apparent nonlocality of the theory. The first major objection (expressed by Einstein at the 1927
Solvay Conference) was that if the wavefunction is interpreted as an extended physical object
in space-time, then the proposed process of wavefunction collapse must occur instantaneously
everywhere that the wavefunction exists—a manifestly nonlocal process, which seems at odds
with special relativity. Many interpretations of quantum mechanics have arisen since those early
days, and some have embraced this type of nonlocality, such as the dynamical collapse theories.1
Many other models circumvent it by removing wavefunction collapse from the theory.
Quantum entanglement produces another type of nonlocality, as discussed by Einstein et.
al. (1935) and Bell (1964). This nonlocality manifests when the empirical correlations between
remote systems cannot be explained by local common causes, which again seems at odds with
special relativity. Some interpretations of quantum mechanics embrace this nonlocality, such
as Bohmian mechanics (Bohm 1952) and the dynamical collapse theories, while others attempt
to circumvent it. The most prominent such attempts are the various many worlds interpreta-
tions inspired by Everett (1957). These attempts to circumvent the nonlocality of entanglement
correlations are the primary focus of this paper.
In Sec. 2 we review the EPR argument of Einstein et. al. and introduce a number of formal
definitions regarding locality and elements of reality, which are then used throughout the paper.
The most crucial notion is that of local causality, which states that there can be no cause and
effect between space-like separated events. A theory which violates this axiom is nonlocal.
In Sec. 3 we review Bell’s “no-go” theorem and (following others, e.g. Myrvold et. al.
(2019 sec. 3.2)) we explain how the theorem concerns local causality and two other implicit
assumptions. We make Bell’s assumptions explicit and refer to them as the no superdeterminism
axiom and the one-world axiom. The former axiom effectively rules out explanations of the
entanglement correlations that appeal to either effects preceding causes or fine-tuning. The
latter axiom is effectively a denial of many worlds. Making these axioms explicit enables one
to reformulate Bell’s theorem. The new formulation is more of a which-way theorem than a
no-go theorem, since the thesis is that at least one of its three axioms must be violated by any
physical theory that reproduces the empirical entanglement correlations. With these axioms
made explicit, Bell’s original proof of his no-go theorem can be interpreted as proving that a
model which obeys one world and no superdeterminism must violate local causality. It logically
follows that if any two of these axioms is true, then the third must be false. Thus, assuming
local causality and no superdeterminism provides an indirect proof of many worlds (Myrvold et.
al. (2019, sec. 8.1.1.)).
In Sec. 4 we provide a direct proof of many worlds from local causality, no superdeterminism
and the relevant empirical facts (i.e. the observed outcomes of measurements in a laboratory).
1See e.g. Pearle (1976) and Ghirardi, Rimini, and Weber (1986).
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The direct proof explicitly shows that after a quantum experiment there must be multiple copies
of each experimenter. This is philosophically significant since it seems to provide an explanation
of many worlds, which may make it more accessible to a skeptical audience. As with Bell’s proof,
our proof makes no use of the quantum formalism – only the axioms of Bell’s theorem and the
relevant empirical facts.
Since we are interested in models that obey both local causality and no superdeterminism,
it will be useful for brevity to introduce the term truly local to refer to models that satisfy
both these axioms. In truly local models all causes are within the backwards light-cone of their
effects. In the next three sections (5-7) we examine a number of alternative many worlds models,
and show that almost none of them are truly local, meaning they must also violate either local
causality or no superdeterminism. Sections 5 and 6 deal with prominent ψ-ontic models whose
ontology is (or is represented by) the universal wavefunction. Section 7 then deals with a model
that replaces the wavefunction with a separable Lorentz-invariant wave-field. We will argue that
it is only by replacing the wavefunction that we can obtain a truly local model.
In Sec. 5 we consider models that postulate many global worlds. A global world is one in
which every macroscopic property has a single definite value. We begin with branching models
where branching happens everywhere if it happens somewhere (Sec. 5.1), creating many global
worlds. We then consider non-branching (“divergent”) models where all global worlds have
always existed (Sec. 5.2). By reformulating Bell’s theorem once again, we prove that none of
these models are truly local.
In Sec. 6 we consider models that postulate semi-local worlds. Semi-local worlds are worlds
created by branching, where the branching only occurs locally for the systems directly involved
in the measurement, and then spreads out through the background space-time as a wave-front
whose speed is bounded by c. In Sec. 6.1 we show that these models cannot be truly local
because they assume a single universal wavefunction. In Sec. 6.2, we consider the arguments of
the Oxford Everettians, who adopt a semi-local model but argue that it is local. We critically
examine these arguments.
In Sec. 7 we consider models that postulate local worlds. Local models exhibit the same local
branching structure as semi-local models, but replace the universal wavefunction in configuration
space with a separable Lorentz-invariant wave-field in space-time. This provides an explicit
example of a truly local many worlds model. Models of this type have yet to be extensively
developed, and are mostly referred to as parallel lives interpretations in the literature.
In Sec. 8 we expand the discussion in several directions. In Sec. 8.1 we discuss proofs of the
Born rule in global and semi-local models that rely on locality principles, and we explain why
local models do not need to prove the Born rule. Finally, in Sec. 8.2 we review a number of
modern interpretations of quantum mechanics. All such interpretations may be categorized in
terms of which axiom(s) they deny — and the only way to evade this fact would be to find an
explicit loophole or logical flaw in the proof of the theorem. We also address some interpretations
that seem to deny or ignore the fact that truly local models must have many worlds. We conclude
with some final remarks in Sec. 9.
2 Local causality
In their celebrated 1935 paper, Einstein, Podolsky, and Rosen [EPR] challenged the completeness
of quantum mechanics. For a description of the world to be complete, on their definition, means
that no element of reality is left out of that description. Thus, they sought to show that some
elements of reality are left out of the quantum mechanical description of the world.
EPR did not define element of reality. Instead, their argument depends on a proposed suf-
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ficient condition on what it takes for something to be an element of reality. (The only other
assumption they make in their argument is that the predictions of quantum mechanics are all
correct.) We will refer to the proposed sufficient condition as the λ-criterion.
λ-criterion: if, without in any way disturbing a system, we can predict with certainty
(i.e. with probability equal to unity) the value of a physical quantity possessed by
that system, then there exists an element of physical reality (λ) corresponding to this
physical quantity.
EPR therefore sought to demonstrate circumstances where quantum mechanics predicts with
certainty the value of a system’s physical quantity, despite failing to describe the underlying
element of reality. Here is an example of such a circumstance. Consider particles a and b, which
are separated by some distance. Their spins are entangled as follows:
|EPR〉 = 1√
2
(
|↑z〉a |↑z〉b − |↓z〉a |↓z〉b
)
(1)
Alice measures the z -spin of particle a. The two possible outcomes have equal probability
of occuring. We now imagine that Bob is about to measure the z -spin of particle b. Quan-
tum mechanics predicts with certainty that Bob will get the same result as Alice. This is an
entanglement correlation of quantum mechanics.
EPR now make a crucial locality assumption: Alice’s measurement cannot disturb Bob’s
particle because Bob and his particle are (arbitrarily) far away. But the instant that Alice
measures her particle, she can use the entanglement correlation to predict with certainty the
value of Bob’s z-spin measurement before he performs it. So by the λ-criterion, there must
already exist an element of reality (λBZ ) corresponding to the value of Bob’s z-spin measurement.
But then equation (1) is an incomplete description: it fails to define λBZ . That’s the argument.
Note that we can write equation (1) down in a different basis and run the exact same argu-
ment. For example,
|EPR〉 = 1√
2
(
|↑y〉a |↑y〉b − |↓y〉a |↓y〉b
)
(2)
In fact, we can run the same argument for any of the continuous infinity of incompatible
electron spin observables. We may then conclude that equation (1) is infinitely incomplete, since
no matter what basis we write it down in, it fails to describe an infinity of elements of reality.
EPR seemingly discovered that the entanglement correlations of quantum mechanics are
inconsistent with the locality assumption that is implicit in the λ-criterion. For the entanglement
correlations suggest that when Alice measures the z-spin of her particle, then no matter how far
away Bob is, the z-spin of Bob’s particle is instantaneously determined. EPR could not believe
that nature involved such nonlocal “action at a distance”.
EPR did not spell out the idea of local causality in any detail. In what follows, we will work
with one natural way of spelling it out (in Sec. 6.2 we consider some related notions of locality).
A natural explication is:
Local causality: There can be no cause and effect between space-like separated
events.
An event is a single point in spacetime. Two events are space-like separated if there exists a
Lorentz frame where the two events occur simultaneously, but in different places. Local causality
then captures the idea that Alice cannot instantaneously “disturb” Bob’s system given that Alice
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and Bob’s system are (arbitrarily) far apart. In general, it means that no intervention at one
event can produce a change of any kind at another space-like separated event.
There is also a notion of locality implicit in EPR’s definition of an element of reality. To
make this explicit, we begin with a more general definition that is independent of local causality :
Element of reality: If a system’s response to an intervention can be predicted with
certainty, then there is an element of reality which determines that response.
An element of reality can exist for general interventions and responses and the definition is
completely independent of cause and effect in space-time – it is just a name we assign to a fact of
nature. To capture the EPR notion, we define a subclass of elements of reality which explicitly
obeys local causality :
Localized element of reality: If an intervention and response happen in a finite
region of space-time, and the response can be predicted with certainty, then there is
an element of reality located only in that region that determines that response.
The localized element of reality must be confined to this finite region; if it were not, then the
response could be affected by causes in a space-like separated region, violating local causality.
With this restricted definition, the element which determines Bob’s outcome must be located
entirely within Bob’s region, which is the other piece of the EPR definition.
3 Reformulating Bell’s theorem
In 1964, John Stuart Bell realized that the existence of EPR’s elements of reality make an
experimental difference. In fact, he found that their existence - together with some additional
(apparently innocuous) assumptions - contradicts the predictions of quantum mechanics. We
axiomatize these assumptions as follows:
Local Causality: There can be no cause and effect between space-like separated
events.
One World: There exists a single-world ontology in which every measurement has
a single definite outcome.
No Superdeterminism: The elements of reality that determine a system’s response
to interventions do not determine what interventions will occur on that system.
In Bell’s original theorem, local causality was stated as a hypothesis (1964, p195), no superde-
terminism was implicit with the exception of an afterthought in the conclusion (1964, p199), and
one world was an unmentioned implicit assumption. The thesis of the reformulated theorem is
that at least one of these three axioms must be violated by any physical theory which reproduces
the empirical entanglement correlations.
The one world axiom is a straightforward denial of many worlds. The no superdeterminism
axiom entails that the set of future interventions on a system is independent of that system’s
present elements of reality. More generally, it enforces the principle that things that should not
be correlated are not correlated, e.g. the results of two classical coin flips. This axiom forbids
such conspiratorial correlations.
Since one world and no superdeterminism are often taken as sacrosanct, it is the third axiom,
local causality, which is usually given up, leading to the statement that quantum mechanics is a
nonlocal theory. For example, the moral drawn by Albert (1992, ch.3):
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“What Bell has given us is a proof that there is as a matter of fact a genuine non-
locality in the actual workings of nature, however we attempt to describe it, period.
That nonlocality is, to begin with, a feature of quantum mechanics itself, and it turns
out (via Bell’s theorem) that it is necessarily also a feature of every possible manner
of calculating (without or with superpositions) which produces the same statistical
predictions as quantum mechanics does; and those predictions are now experimen-
tally known to be correct [...] and so the assumption that the physical workings of
the world are invariably local must (astonishingly) be false.”
Here, we prove the which-way theorem by showing that obeying true locality and the empirical
entanglement correlations requires a many-worlds ontology, and thus violation of the one world
axiom. Our proof makes use of several preliminary concepts. First, we say there is a reproducible
perfect correlation between two systems if and only if the observed outcome of a measurement
on one system is necessary for the observed outcome of a measurement on the other system to
be predicted with certainty, every time the systems are prepared and measured in the same way.
We assume that a reproducible perfect correlation between two systems must have a cause,
and so should not be attributed to coincidence. Then, if such a correlation exists between two
space-like separated events, local causality requires that the cause be space-like separated from
neither of those events. Furthermore, no superdeterminism requires that the cause be in the
past of those events, since the present elements must be independent of future interventions. We
formalize these facts with the following theorem:
Local correlation: A reproducible perfect correlation between two or more space-
like separated regions can only be caused by a correlated set of localized elements of
reality in the intersection of the past light-cones of those regions.
From local correlation, we know that because Alice’s and Bob’s outcomes are perfectly cor-
related, those outcomes must be determined by correlated localized elements of reality in the
intersection of the past light-cones of the two measurements. No superdeterminism also tells us
that those elements of reality are independent of Alice’s future decision to measure, say, z -spin,
and similarly for Bob.
4 Proving Bell’s theorem with many worlds
Perhaps the simplest proof of Bell’s theorem is due to Greenberger, Horne, and Zeilinger (1989).
Their version uses a particular state of three spins a, b, and c called the GHZ state. The three
particles are entangled at the source so that they subsequently obey the following empirically
confirmed2 correlations:
Entanglement correlations:
XXX = −1, Y Y X = +1, XY Y = +1, Y XY = +1
2The first experiments that confirmed entanglement correlations were performed by Freedman and Clauser
(1972) and then Aspect et al. (1982). Tittel et al. (1998) sent entangled photons in fibre optic cables apart by
more than 10km and still found the entanglement correlations, showing that they are not affected by distance. Pan
et al. (2000) were the first to confirm the entanglement correlations specific to the GHZ state. These experiments
were forced to make certain assumptions which led to potential loopholes that EPR could in principle escape
from. However, more recently, a number of loophole-free experiments have been performed (e.g. Giustina et al.
(2015); Hensen et al. (2015); and Shalm et al. (2015)). The entanglement correlations of quantum mechanics
were again confirmed.
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The correlation XXX = −1 means that no matter what outcomes are observed by Alice,
Bob, and Charlie after they all measure X (x-spin), the product of their eigenvalues will be
-1. The correlation Y Y X = +1 means that no matter what outcomes are observed by Alice,
Bob, and Charlie after Alice and Bob measure Y and Charlie measures X, the product of their
eigenvalues will be +1. And so on for XY Y and Y XY .
Particles a, b, and c are prepared in the GHZ state and then sent to Alice, Bob, and Charlie,
respectively, at mutual space-like separation. Alice, Bob, and Charlie then each randomly select
the X or Y measurement basis for their measurement.
Let us consider a situation in which the following choices of measurement settings are made.
Alice chooses to measure X and obtains an outcome λAX = l ∈ [1,−1]. Bob and Charlie also
measured X and obtained outcomes λBX = m ∈ [1,−1] and λCX = −λAXλBX = −lm respectively,
where the form of Charlie’s value is required to satisfy entanglement correlation XXX = −1.
Specifically, this means that there exists an Alice, a Bob, and a Charlie who experienced these
correlated outcomes while they were at mutual space-like separation, and who may later report
these outcomes to one another.
Because of local correlation, explaining the perfect entanglement correlation requires that
what determines their outcomes, λAX , λ
B
X , and λ
C
X are localized elements of reality, and that
the correlation between the three was caused by correlated localized elements of reality at the
source where the state was prepared. To summarize, we can say that based on these choices of
measurement, the outcomes must be determined by the following localized elements of reality :
Choice Set 1:
C1A : λ
A
X = l ∈ [1,−1]
C1B : λ
B
X = m ∈ [1,−1]
C1C : λ
C
X = −λAXλBX = −lm [from XXX = −1]
Now consider the situation in which Alice and Bob instead chose to measure Y . Due to local
causality, their choices cannot change Charlie’s localized element, λCX . Due to no superdetermin-
ism, Charlie’s localized element cannot depend in advance on Alice and Bob’s future choice of
measurement settings. Consequently, these alternate choices cannot make any difference at all
to the Charlie who experienced outcome λCX = −lm in Choice Set 1. Alice now gets outcome
λAY = n ∈ [1,−1] and Bob now gets outcome λBY = λAY λCX = −lmn, where the form of λBY is
required to obey entanglement correlation Y Y X = +1. Again, the existence of an Alice, Bob,
and Charlie who got these correlated outcomes at space-like separation requires that λAY and λ
B
Y
are localized elements whose correlation originated at the source. To summarize:
Choice Set 2:
C2A : λ
A
Y = n ∈ [1,−1]
C2B : λ
B
Y = λ
A
Y λ
C
X = −lmn [from Y Y X = +1]
C1C : λ
C
X = −λAXλBX = −lm [from Set 1]
Now consider the situation in which Alice and Charlie measured Y while Bob measured X. It
follows that we would still have the Alice who experienced λAY = n and the Bob who experienced
λBX = m, and in order to obey Y XY = +l, Charlie must now get λ
C
Y = mn, with the correlation
between the three originating at the source. To summarize:
Choice Set 3:
C2A : λ
A
Y = n [from Set 2]
C1B : λ
B
X = m [from Set 1]
C3C : λ
C
Y = mn [from Y XY = +1]
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Finally, consider the situation in which Alice measured X, while Bob and Charlie measured
Y . It is a fact that there must exist a Bob who experienced λBY = −lmn and a Charlie who
experienced λCY = mn, so there must exist an Alice who experienced λ
A
X = λ
B
Y λ
C
Y = −l in order
to satisfy the entanglement correlation XY Y = +1. This gives:
Choice Set 4:
C1A : λ
A
X = λ
B
Y λ
C
Y = −l [from XY Y = +1]
C2B : λ
B
Y = −lmn [from Set 2]
C3C : λ
C
Y = mn [from Set 3]
Here we have labelled Alice’s X measurement C1A because it must be the same measurement
that is described in Set 1. But notice that the results contradict. We began with a situation
in which Alice experiences outcome λAX = l ∈ [1,−1]. By simply respecting the entanglement
correlations and imposing local causality and no superdeterminism we have derived the conclusion
that in the exact same situation, Alice experiences outcome λAX = −l, and thus the one world
axiom is violated, which proves our reformulated version of Bell’s theorem.
To be clear, any truly local physical theory must predict that there are two Alices after the
measurement, one who experienced outcome λAX = +l, and another who experienced outcome
λAX = −l. The localized element of reality λAX = (l,−l) is therefore multivalued, predicting the
existence of multiple distinct copies of Alice, who are evidently also invisible to one another.
And since we know there exists an Alice who got l and a Bob who got −lmn, there must
be a Charlie who got −mn in addition to the Charlie who got mn. Repeated applications of
these arguments shows that every measurement setting results in (at least) two copies of each
observer. We thus have a many worlds ontology.
Importantly, we have arrived at this conclusion without ever invoking a wavefunction in
Hilbert space. Only local causality, no superdeterminism, and experimental facts were used to
prove the existence of many worlds for each macroscopic observer. We now move to the question
of whether a self-consistent truly local many worlds theory can actually exist.
5 Global worlds
For the purpose of this paper, we define a global world as one in which every macroscopic property
has a single definite value.
In the following subsections we will discuss two variant many global worlds models. In the
first, the global worlds are created by branching (global branching), in the second, there is no
branching – each global world has always existed (global divergence).
5.1 Global branching
The distinction between global and local branching was introduced by Sebens and Carroll (2018,
pp.33-5). Later, we will argue that even what they call “local branching”, is not really local.
We will therefore refer to it as semi-local branching. We can understand the distinction with the
following example. If Alice has measured the x-spin of particle a, while Bob is yet to measure
particle b, then we can represent the overall quantum state as follows:
1√
2
(|↑x〉a |“ ↑x ”〉A |↑x〉b + |↓x〉a |“ ↓x ”〉A |↓x〉b)⊗ |R〉B (3)
Equivalently, we can represent it like this:
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xx'
t t'
object 2object 1
E1 E2
E3 E4
Figure 1: A space-time diagram showing two objects in two different Lorentz frames, S and S′.
Consider the case that object 1 is made to branch at event E1. In frame S, this causes object 2 to
branch at E2, because E1 and E2 are simultaneous in S. But in frame S
′ E2 is not simultaneous
with E1, and thus object 2 does not branch there, which makes the branching situation at event
E2 ill-defined. In order to obtain a model with well-defined events in space-time, we must either
choose a preferred Lorentz frame in which branching occurs (e.g. only S or only S′), or we must
adopt the view that if branching occurs in any frame, then the object has branched in all frames.
If we take this latter view, then object 1 branching at E1 causes object 2 to branch at E2 in S,
which causes object 1 to branch at E3 in S
′, which causes object 2 branch at E4 in S, and so on,
until both objects are branched for all time.
1√
2
(|↑x〉a |“ ↑x ”〉A |↑x〉b |R〉B + |↓x〉a |“ ↓x ”〉A |↓x〉b |R〉B) (4)
According to semi-local branching, (3) is a more transparent representation of the ontology:
since Alice has not interacted with Bob, Bob does not branch. But according to global branching,
branching happens everywhere if it happens somewhere, so if Alice branches then Bob branches
instantaneously. In that case, (4) is a more transparent representation of the ontology, since it
represents two (qualitatively identical yet numerically distinct) Bobs. We now consider whether
the global branching ontology is truly local. We will argue that it is not.
In the relativistic context, the idea that branching happens everywhere if it happens some-
where entails that branching occurs simultaneously throughout a space-like hypersurface. One
way of making sense of this idea involves postulating a preferred Lorentz frame such that branch-
ing occurs simultaneously everywhere in a space-like hypersurface in that frame. This would
allow branching at an event to be well-defined (frame-invariant). If there is no preferred frame,
but branching still occurs simultaneously throughout space-like hypersurfaces, then there is a
different narrative of branching events in each Lorentz frame – which renders branching at an
event ill-defined (frame-relative).3 In this case, the ontology includes all of the different (well-
3This appears to be the option that Sebens and Carroll opt for: “In a relativistic context, one natural option
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defined) branching narratives for all Lorentz frames (e.g. somewhere object 2 branches at E2,
and somewhere it does not, as in Fig. 1.), with objects branching simultaneously everywhere
in a space-like hypersurface of a given frame – independently of when they branch in any other
frame.
Now, whether we consider a preferred frame, or just any frame in which global branching
occurs, it seems that local causality is violated, since Alice causes Bob to branch instantaneously.
To contest this, one could claim that Alice is not the cause of Bob’s branching, because their
branching has a local common cause. However, for this explanation to work, Bob would have
to carry with him a local element of reality that determines that he will branch at the right
time (i.e. simultaneously with Alice’s measurement). Such an element would then enable us to
predict when Alice’s measurement will cause the composite Alice-Bob system to branch, which
violates no superdeterminism. Hence, any global branching model which entails that branching
occurs simultaneously everywhere in a space-like hypersurface must violate at least two of the
axioms of Bell’s theorem, one world, and either local causality or no superdeterminism.
A remaining possbility for making sense of global branching does not posit a preferred frame,
yet aims to treat branching as well-defined (frame-invariant). But under these assumptions,
‘branching anywhere means branching everywhere’ implies ‘branching at any time means branch-
ing at all times’. To see this, consider two always-distant objects in two different frames, as in
Fig. 1. This would result in a divergent worlds model since all branches must have always
pre-existed.4 In the next section, we show that even a model of this type cannot be truly local.
5.2 Global divergence
In a branching worlds ontology, a measurement splits one world into multiple worlds. But in a
divergent worlds ontology, a measurement reveals pre-existing multiple worlds, which were, up
until the measurement, qualitatively identical.
Divergent worlds entails that all the worlds that will ever need to exist to accommodate the
different experiences of macroscopic objects have always existed. Subsets of such worlds are
qualitatively identical until corresponding macroscopic objects experience different outcomes,
at which point they diverge.5 But nothing thereby happens at locations remote from these
macroscopic objects. Consequently, local elements of reality are not required at every point in
space, as in global branching. Divergent worlds thus seem to have a better chance of satisfying
the remaining axioms of Bell’s theorem, but things are not so simple.
Let us reformulate Bell’s theorem for the new scenario.
Local Causality: There can be no cause and effect between space-like separated
events.
Outcome Definiteness: Every measurement has a single definite outcome in each
global world.
No Superdeterminism: The elements of reality that determine a system’s response
to interventions do not determine what interventions will occur on that system.
would be to say that although the number of copies of an observer is frame-relative, the probabilities assigned to
measurement outcomes are not.” (2018, p35 footnote 7.)
4Although they use the language of ‘branching’, Sebens and Carroll (2018, p31) note that they do not mean to
prejudge the global branching versus global divergence issue, since their proof of the Born rule can be implemented
on either picture.
5This notion of diverging worlds subsumes the notion of overlapping worlds (see Saunders and Wallace (2008)
and Saunders (2010)). Although these authors go on to distinguish these notions, the argument of this section
applies to both.
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Here, we have simply replaced the one world axiom with the equivalent axiom for many
global worlds, which we call outcome definiteness. We can label and index the different global
worlds in terms of the outcomes that macroscopic objects experience within them. In each
world, the entanglement correlations of any entangled state that was measured must be obeyed.
Returning to the GHZ example, if Alice, Bob, and Charlie all measured X, then there must
be four different types of global worlds, corresponding to outcomes w1 ≡ (+1A + 1B ;−1C),
w2 ≡ (+1A;−1B ; +1C), w3 ≡ (−1A; +1B ; +1C), w4 ≡ (−1A;−1B ;−1C), since these are the four
combinations that satisfy XXX = −1.
Since each global world must obey the XXX = −1 correlation, even while the Alice, Bob,
and Charlie within that world remain at space-like separation, the correlation must be caused by
correlated local elements of reality at the source. We already know that the localized elements
of reality, λAX , λ
B
X , and λ
C
X must be multivalued. But this new requirement means that they
must each contain four distinct values, with each one indicating the outcome experienced in a
particular global world. In this example we have the following localized elements of reality :
λAX = (+1
w1 ,+1w2 ,−1w3 ,−1w4),
λBX = (+1
w1 ,−1w2 ,+1w3 ,−1w4), and
λCX = (−1w1 ,+1w2 ,+1w3 ,−1w4).
Now, from no superdeterminism it follows that if, on this same run, Alice and Bob had
instead decided to measure Y , while Charlie still measures X, then after the measurement
there will still exist a Charlie in each of the four worlds w1, w2, w3, and w4, who experienced
outcomes λCX = (−1w1 ,+1w2 ,+1w3 ,−1w4), which means that Alice and Bob must now experience
Y outcomes in the same four global worlds.
Since the correlation Y Y X = +1 must be obeyed in each of the four global worlds, Alice
must have a localized element of reality λAY = (l
w1 ,mw2 , nw3 , ow4), and Bob must have a localized
element of reality λBY = (−lw1 ,mw2 , nw3 ,−ow4), with l, m, n, o ∈ [+1,−1].
Now, if, on the same run, Alice and Charlie had decided to measure Y , while Bob had
measured X, and Y XY = +1 is obeyed in each of the four worlds, then Charlie must also have
a localized element of reality λCY = (l
w1 ,−mw2 , nw3 ,−ow4).
Now, finally, if Alice had decided to measure X, while Bob and Charlie had measured Y ,
the correlation XY Y = +1 must be obeyed. But if we consider the known localized elements of
reality, we see that
λAXλ
B
Y λ
C
Y = ((+1 · −l · l)w1 , (+1 ·m · −m)w2 , (−1 · n · n)w3 , (−1 · −n · −n)w4)
= (−1w−1, −1w2 , −1w3 , −1w4) 6= +1.
This contradiction shows that no truly local global worlds model can reproduce the empirical
correlations.
6 Semi-local worlds
6.1 Semi-local branching
Recall the distinction between global and semi-local branching, in terms of the situation described
by equations (3) and (4). We can also consider the situation right after Bob performs an X
measurement:
|ψ〉 = 1√
2
(|↑x〉a |“ ↑x ”〉A |↑x〉b |“ ↑x ”〉B + |↓x〉a |“ ↓x ”〉A |↓x〉b |“ ↓x ”〉B) (5)
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Both global and local branching agree that this is the correct expression, but the interpre-
tation is different if signals have not reached Alice from Bob’s site (or Bob from Alice’s site).
Alice has split into two descendants, so has Bob, but there is not yet a world containing an Alice
and a Bob. The branching caused by a measurement event spreads through the environment as
systems interact with one another, creating a wavefront whose speed is bounded by c. A world
containing a Bob and an Alice is only created when the wavefront from Alice’s measurement
meets the wavefront from Bob’s measurement.
Semi-local branching is designed to avoid measurement-induced action at a distance. Conse-
quently, many authors have deemed the theory local (as we discuss in the next section). Here
we examine whether semi-local branching models are truly local.
Recall that from local causality and element of reality we were able to deduce localized element
of reality. We now apply this principle to the region where Alice and Bob meet to compare their
results, which we will treat as the moment at which a world containing both an Alice and a Bob
is created, i.e., when the two wavefronts meet.
After her measurement, Alice branches into descendants with different outcomes. Focus on a
descendant that obtained spin up. She can predict with certainty that if Bob measured X and
she meets him, then he will have found spin up too. There must therefore be a localized element
of reality at their meeting event which determines that the up Alice meets an up Bob (and not a
down Bob, who is also present in space-time; the down Bob meets a down Alice). This element,
λAB , enforces the entanglement correlation encoded in (5).
This entanglement correlation originated at the entanglement event of particles a and b. For if
Alice and Bob had performed their measurements prior to the entanglement, then the correlation
would not manifest at their meeting and there would be no reason to posit λAB . Moreover, Alice
and Bob can perform their measurements arbitrarily soon after the entanglement event, and the
correlation would manifest.
We now consider what was needed to create λAB . For this we invoke local causality once
again, to define a constraint on how localized elements can be created:
Localized element synthesis: A new localized element is created in a region only
by existing localized elements in that region.
If localized element synthesis were not true, then a localized element could be created by
space-like separated elements of reality.
The localized element λAB enforces a correlation concerning what outcome Alice reports to
Bob (and vice versa). To determine what created λAB , we must trace back through Alice and
Bob’s past, and consider what events could have created λAB .
After Alice measures a, she can predict with certainty that if she measures a again, she will
get the same result. There must therefore be an element of reality λAa, localized to Alice’s region,
that determines this response. Similarly, after Bob measures b, he can predict with certainty that
he will get the same result, so his region contains λBb. However, these elements are insufficient
to enforce the correlation at Alice and Bob’s meeting, since they are consistent with the absence
of λab.
After Alice measures a, she can predict with certainty what outcome she would get if she
then measured Bob’s particle b before Bob gets to it. So there must be an element λAb that
determines this response to that intervention. Crucially, λAb must have been created when Alice
measured a, and so by localized element synthesis, must be located in this region – for if Alice
had measured b before she measured a, she would have been unable to predict the result of the
b measurement.
Similarly, after Bob measures b, he can predict what he would get if he measured a before Alice
gets to it. So there must be an element λBa that determines that response to that intervention,
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Figure 2: Space-time diagram of the two-spin Bell test, showing the synthesis of localized elements
of reality (the λs) at the source S, the measurements MA and MB , and the final meeting F . In
order to locally synthesize the correlated elements of reality, identical copies of the nonseparable
wavefunction Ψ must also be localized elements of reality present at both MA and MB . However,
the copy at MA (MB) is instantaneously updated by Bob’s (Alice’s) measurement, which violates
local causality.
and is localized to Bob’s region. It is λAa, λAb, λBa, and λBb that interact at the meeting of
Alice and Bob to create λAB .
Elements λAa, λAb, λBa, and λBb in turn depend on λab. We may therefore conclude that all
five of these elements were necessary to create λAB . The creation process is depicted in Fig. 2.
We now ask whether these localized elements, whose existence is required by true locality,
can be accounted for by semi-local branching. Typically, the ontology of semi-local models
is exhaustively described by the wavefunction.6 However, advocates of semi-local branching
models (as well as advocates of global branching models) claim that the wave function enables
us to define local descriptions of regions, in the form of reduced density operators.7 Perhaps,
then, λAb could be accounted for by the reduced density operator local to Alice’s region and λBa
could be accounted for by the reduced density operator local to Bob’s region. But a moment’s
reflection reveals that this cannot be the case. For the reduced density operator local to Alice’s
region simply fails to describe the entanglement correlation manifested by Alice’s measurement of
b after she measures a, e.g., Tr
((
ρAa |↑〉Aa 〈↑|Aa
)⊗ (ρBb |↑〉Bb 〈↑|Bb )) 6= ∣∣ 〈ψ| ( |↑〉Aa ⊗ |↑〉Bb )∣∣2,
and likewise for any other entangled state.
The entanglement correlations enforced by the localized elements of reality that we have
6This statement is neutral as to whether the wavefunction is the complete ontology (wavefunction realism) or
is the complete description of the ontology. In Sec. 6.2 we apply our argument to another semi-local ontology,
spacetime state realism.
7See Sebens and Carroll (2018, pp.66-8) and the views discussed in the next section.
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identified, are ultimately contained in the wavefunction, in semi-local branching models. The
wavefunction, however, is not a localized entity. Still, if we impose local causality and local
synthesis, then what determines the correlations in these models - Ψ - must be localized to
the relevant regions. In that case, there must be multiple identical copies of it, for example,
one located at Alice’s region, and one located at Bob’s region. However, any copy of Ψ must
contain all correlation rules, so the copy located in Alice’s region contains information about
Bob’s space-like separated measurement (and vice versa), which violates local causality.
One possible loophole in this argument is that the different localized copies of Ψ are incomplete
pieces produced by local common causes with pre-arranged consistency. However, this is just like
assigning the correlated outcomes to global worlds in advance, and thus the argument of Sec.
5.2 already shows that this type of local common cause cannot be consistent with the empirical
correlations.
In summary, semi-local models, in which all of nature is described by a single universal
wavefunction Ψ, cannot be truly local.
In recent years, the so-called Oxford Everettians have become the most prominent advocates
of semi-local branching. They have also developed an analogous position called spacetime state
realism. They argue that these are local theories, which contradicts our previous analysis. The
next section is therefore devoted to a critical analysis of the Oxford Everettian approach to
locality.
6.2 Oxford Everettianism
Oxford Everettianism refers to a prominent way of expanding upon the many worlds interpre-
tation of Everett [1957], which has been contributed to by many Oxford-affiliated foundations
experts. Here we focus on the accounts of locality found in Timpson and Brown (2002), Wallace
and Timpson (2010), Wallace (2012 ch.8), and Brown and Timpson (2016).
In Wallace and Timpson (2010) and Wallace (2012 ch.8) a semi-local branching model in
spacetime is developed, which is dubbed spacetime state realism [SSR]. We begin by analyzing
this model as it is presented in Wallace (2012, ch.8), since one of the main purposes of his chapter
is “to determine whether Everettian quantum mechanics is in a relevant sense nonlocal” (p292).
Wallace distinguishes two notions of nonlocality. The first is action at a distance which occurs
when “given two systems A and B which are separated in space, a disturbance to A causes an
immediate change in the state of B, without any intervening dynamical process connecting A
and B” (p.293). This seems equivalent to our definition of nonlocality which states that there
can be no cause and effect between space-like separated events.8
Wallace’s second notion of nonlocality is nonseparability, which occurs when, “given two re-
gions A and B, a complete specification of the states of A and B separately fails to fix the state
of the combined system, in addition to the facts about the two individual systems” (p293). The
question of nonlocality then breaks down to the questions of whether the theory exhibits action
at a distance, and whether it exhibits nonseparability. SSR is intended answer these questions.
It is a semi-local branching model where the universe can be divided into subsystems. The
density operator of each subsystem represents “the intrinsic properties which that subsystem
instantiates, just as the field values assigned to each spacetime point in electromagnetism repre-
sented the (electromagnetic) intrinsic properties which that point instantiated.” (p299). Regions
of spacetime (and their unions) are what has these intrinsic properties.
SSR is then said to be local in the sense of no action at a distance, but nonlocal in the sense of
exhibiting nonseparability (pp.302-305). It exhibits nonseparability because knowing the density
8Wallace rightly distinguishes action at a distance from no signalling, and states that the latter entails the
former but not vice versa.
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operators of regions A and B does not suffice to fix the density operator of A∪B. But it avoids
action at a distance because “the quantum state of any region depends only on the quantum
state of some cross-section of the past light cone of that region. Disturbances cannot propagate
into that light cone” (p302). Nonseparability is described as not being a matter of dynamics,
but of ontology (p293), and so the ultimate conclusion is that Everettian quantum theory is a
theory of local interactions and nonlocal states (p305).
The claim that nonseparability is not a matter of dynamics, but of ontology, is puzzling. We
postulate entities in our ontology because of the dynamical effects we think those entities have
on ourselves and our measuring instruments. The exception is abstract entities such as numbers;
some postulate that numbers exist on the basis of their essential role in formulating physical theo-
ries (Platonism). But Wallace and Timpson are not thinking of the subsystem states represented
by density operators as abstract entities. They are supposed to be intrinsic physical properties
of physical systems. Their nonlocal nature must therefore manifest dynamically somehow.
Following Timpson and Brown (2002), Wallace explains that the nonseparable state of A∪B
is to be understood in terms of an entanglement relation between the intrinsic state of A and the
intrinsic state of B. The key claim is then that nonseparable states can be dynamically relevant,
but only when the distance of the entanglement relation is reduced to zero. Wallace provides an
instructive analogy:
“Somewhat picturesquely, we can think of entanglement between states as a string
connecting those states, representing the nonlocal relation between them. We can
move either end of the string by local interactions, and we can cause the string to ‘fray’
at either end by entangling the system at each end with adjacent systems. But we
cannot access the information content of the string - i.e. we cannot set up dynamical
processes whose outcomes are dependent on the nonlocal properties represented by
the string - without moving the two ends of the string until they coincide. In this
way, nonseparability remains fully consistent with dynamical locality” (p304).
This analysis contradicts the conclusion of the previous section. To recap, we can break our
argument down into four steps. First, local causality demands that there be localized elements
of reality at Alice’s and Bob’s regions that determine the relevant entanglement correlations.
Second, the only local objects in semi-local models are those described by local density operators.
Third, local density operators are insufficient to describe the localized elements. Fourth, since in
semi-local models, the relevant entanglement correlations are encoded in the entire wavefunction,
the view must place copies of it at the distinct regions, which inevitably violates local causality.
We expect that Wallace et. al. will have no objection to the second and third steps of
our argument. For they agree that reduced density operators are insufficient to capture the
entanglement correlations. Instead of postulating localized copies of the wavefunction to capture
these correlations, they instead postulate entanglement relations (the “strings”). So they reject
step four. And this rejection can be traced back to a rejection of step one, since the idea appears
to be that these spatially extended strings can do the job of the localized elements, but without
violating local causality.
But this seems incorrect. When Alice entangles with particle a, she entangles with particle
b, thereby physically affecting the string connecting a and b. But there is no local chain of cause
and effect running down the string at strictly subluminal speeds. The entire string is affected
instantaneously by Alice. And since part of the string is in Bob’s region, local causality is violated.
Wallace effectively replaces this nonlocal causation with a nonlocal relation between the regions
of Alice and Bob. We think it is merely verbal whether we describe the action at a distance as
a relation or not. This semantic choice does not obviate the violation of local causality. The
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nonseparability of the Bell states entails nonlocal action in semi-local world models, such as SSR.
Such nonseparability is just one out of many ways of creating a violation of local causality.
Brown and Timpson do not distinguish two notions of nonlocality. Instead, they provide
a historical analysis of Bell, who began with our intuitive constraint on local causality (Bell,
1964), but who ended with a mathematical notion, called factorisability, which effectively just
rules out nonseparability (Bell, 1990). Brown and Timpson (2016) argue that when we move
to the context of non-separable theories (e.g. SSR), we can see that “Bell’s mathematically
formulated conditions fail properly to capture his intuitive notions of locality” (p113). First,
they note that to derive factorisability from local causality, one needs a common cause principle:
“[I]n order to move from Bell’s informal statement of local causality—that the prox-
imate causes should be nearby them, and causal chains leading up to these events
should lie on or within their past light-cones—to its mathematical formulation in
terms of factorisability [...], something like Reichenbach’s principle [of common cause]
is appealed to: statistical correlations between events must be explained either by
direct causal links between them, or in terms of a Reichenbachian common-cause in
the past.” (p113)
We agree. Indeed, all throughout the paper we have appealed to local correlation. But
according to Brown and Timpson, in the context of semi-local models, “the common cause
principle is unnatural and unmotivated” (p113):
“This is for a very simple reason: in a nonseparable theory there is a further way
in which correlations can be explained which Reichenbach’s stipulations miss out:
correlations between systems (e.g., the fact that certain correlations between mea-
surement outcomes will be found to obtain in the future) can be explained directly
by irreducible relational properties holding between the systems, relational properties
themselves which can be further explained in dynamical terms as arising under local
dynamics from a previous non-separable state for the total system” (pp.113-4)
What Brown and Timpson have here missed, is that the local correlation constraint is deriv-
able from the local causality and no superdeterminism constraints. This was proved in Sec. 3,
where we saw that a reproducible correlation between two space-like separated regions can only
have a past cause in a region that is space-like separated from neither of those two regions.
Referring to the relevant nonlocal causal processes as “irreducible relational properties”, again,
does not obviate the violation of local causality.
Thus, because of their insistence on a single universal wavefunction (or irreducible entangle-
ment relations), empirically consistent semi-local models, such as SSR, cannot be truly local.
We now consider local many worlds models that abandon the universal wavefunction.
7 Local worlds
Local worlds models aim to obey both local causality and no superdeterminism unequivocally, and
to remain consistent with special relativity. In special relativity, the only fundamental objects
consistent with local causality are point-like, and these follow world-lines through space-time.
Thus, in these models a local world is defined as the experience of a point object as it follows its
own world-line through space-time. The experience of a point object is simply a record of the
outcomes of interaction events where its past world-line intersected the world lines of other point
objects. A given quantum system (such as an electron) is composed of many such point objects.
For a given system, point objects which record the same outcomes are qualitatively identical, and
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thus they effectively experience the same world, whereas those which record different outcomes
diverge into different worlds. The many world-lines of all systems in the universe occupy the
same background space-time.
The experience of a macroscopic object involves frequent intersections of the world-lines of
the many point-objects that comprise it, and their respective records of interaction outcomes.
The experience of an observer is not identical to the conscious experience of the observer – the
simple recording of information does not by itself constitute consciousness. In many cases, we can
approximate macroscopic objects like Alice and Bob as point-like objects following world-lines
through space-time.
Local worlds models have a much less developed literature, mostly using the name parallel
lives (Brassard and Raymond-Robichaud 2013, 2017, and 2019; Waegell 2017 and 2018). There
is also some variation within the family of local many worlds models, and here we discuss only
one such model. The premise of local worlds models is similar to that of semi-local worlds, in
that branching or divergence of worlds begins at a measurement event, and then spreads out as
a wave-front whose speed is bounded by c. However, in local worlds, we give up the universal
wavefunction, and instead adopt a relativistic wave-field which has a fixed definite value at each
point in space-time. The wave-field contains the bounded wave-fronts explicitly, and is consistent
with all of the local elements of reality required by true locality (see Fig. 2), resulting in a Lorentz
invariant model of quantum physics.
To understand the ontology, we define a subclass of the localized elements of reality by con-
tracting the finite region of space-time in which the intervention and response occur down to a
single event:
Local element of reality: If an intervention and response happen at a single event,
and the response can be predicted with certainty, then there is a point-like element
of reality located at that event which determines that response.
The local element of reality must be point-like; if it were not, then the instantaneous response
could be affected by space-like separated causes, violating local causality.
In local branching models, a measurement induces the world-line of a system to branch into
multiple new world lines with different experiences, all occupying the same background space-
time. In local divergence models, there are already many identical copies of the world-line of a
system, and these experience different outcomes when the system is measured, and thus diverge
from one another. In what follows we adopt the divergence picture.
In the Bell experiment, when Alice performs her measurement, her world-lines diverge, and
everything is truly local. This is accomplished by providing an explicit dynamical model that
produces all of the local elements of reality discussed in Sec. 6.1. For this, we will make use of the
the wave-field |ψ(~x, t)〉, which is a wave-function-valued field in space-time, in which influences
propagate at or below c. The value of |ψ(~x, t)〉 at each event is a fixed record of a wavefunction
at that event, and that record is independent of anything outside the past light-cone of that
event. |ψ(~x, t)〉 is thus a sort of vector field, with a unique Hilbert space vector at each point
in space-time. This makes |ψ(~x, t)〉 fundamentally separable in space-time, even if the Hilbert
space vector at a given event is entangled.
In this model, the local element of reality at the source event, S, is the wave-field at that
point in space-time,
|ψ〉Sa,b =
1√
2
(|↑x〉a |↑x〉b + |↓x〉a |↓x〉b) (6)
This wavefunction is a fixed record of the source event, which is now carried by both system a
and system b. When Alice performs her measurement on a at event MA, her wavefunction is
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entangled with the wavefunction carried by a to create the new wavefunction,
|ψ〉MAa,b,A = UAa
1√
2
(|↑x〉a |↑x〉b+|↓x〉a |↓x〉b) |R〉A =
1√
2
(|↑x〉a |↑x〉b |↑x〉A+|↓x〉a |↓x〉b |↓x〉A). (7)
This fixed record of event MA is now carried by both Alice and system a. Likewise, when Bob
measures system b at event MB, the new wavefunction they obtain is,
|ψ〉MBa,b,B = UBb
1√
2
(|↑x〉a |↑x〉b+|↓x〉a |↓x〉b) |R〉B =
1√
2
(|↑x〉a |↑x〉b |↑x〉B+|↓x〉a |↓x〉b |↓x〉B). (8)
Note that these local values of the wave-field are consistent with the localized elements of reality
from Sec. 6.1 and Fig. 2, and that they respect local causality, because |ψ〉MAa,b,A contains no
information about Bob, and |ψ〉MBa,b,B contains no information about Alice.
When Alice and Bob meet at event F , their respective wavefunctions combine to produce the
new wavefunction,
|ψ〉Fa,b,B = UAaUBb
1√
2
(|↑x〉a |↑x〉b + |↓x〉a |↓x〉b) |R〉A |R〉B (9)
=
1√
2
(|↑x〉a |↑x〉b |↑x〉A |↑x〉B + |↓x〉a |↓x〉b |↓x〉A |↓x〉B),
and this determines which copies of Alice can meet which copies of Bob. In the general case,
different unitary operations UAa and UBb correspond to arbitrary measurement settings.
In summary, we have shown that truly local many worlds models are possible, with a separable
wave-field |ψ(~x, t)〉 in space-time instead of a universal wavefunction Ψ in configuration space.
Examples like this serve as a guide, but the correct generalizations of the Schro¨dinger and Dirac
equations for the wave-field are not yet known.
Finally, we note that many local worlds models have strong similarities to several existing
models, which violate true locality. First, the many-interacting-world models of Hall et al. (2010)
and Schiff and Poirier (2012), which are related to Bohmian mechanics, also describe trajectories
for many individual worlds, but each world is a point in configuration space rather than space-
time. Second, the so-called many-worlds interpretation of Schro¨dinger from Allori et al. (2010),
which has point objects in space-time as worlds, but which they conclude is nonlocal.
8 Discussion
8.1 Proofs of the Born rule
The distinctive features of the various many worlds models are often postulated to explain the
origin of the Born rule. Here we consider the general structure of Born rule proofs in the many
worlds literature, the reliance of some of those proofs on locality principles, and the sense in
which local worlds models circumvent the need for such a proof.
On a branching model, it is difficult to make sense of the probabilistic predictions of quantum
mechanics. Pre-measurement, Alice might assert “there is a 0.7 probability that I will see spin-up
(rather than spin-down)”. But given branching, it seems that Alice should assign probability 1
to there being an Alice descendant that sees spin-up. Pre-measurement Alice is not uncertain
of anything; she knows she will branch into descendants that see contrary results in different
worlds, and she knows that neither of her descendants is the “real” Alice—they both have equal
claim to being pre-measurement Alice. It is therefore unclear what the “probability 0.7” is a
probability of. This aspect of the problem is often referred to as the incoherence problem.
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The divergence model was proposed by Saunders and Wallace (2008) and Saunders (2010)
to introduce uncertainty into Alice’s pre-measurement situation. In this model, the descendant
Alices did not branch from a single ancestor Alice. Instead, the descendant Alices were always
numerically distinct. The measurement merely caused the pre-measurement Alices to diverge
i.e. become qualitatively distinct. Now any given pre-measurement Alice has something to be
uncertain about: “am I an Alice that is located in a world that will have a spin-up result?
The quantitative problem of why Alice should be certain to degree 0.7 that she is in a spin-up
world is not solved by divergent models alone. Proofs of the Born rule are developed to solve the
quantitative problem. The Oxford Everettians have developed a well-known decision-theoretic
proof (Wallace 2012, P.II). Here, we set this approach aside as we wish to discuss proofs that
rely on locality principles.
In branching models, many approaches deny that Alice is uncertain about the future, but
argue that Alice is uncertain about her location in the multiverse often enough to solve the
incoherence problem. This approach is taken by McQueen and Vaidman (2019) in the context
of semi-local branching and by Sebens and Carroll (2018) in the context of global branching.
Proofs of the Born rule typically have two major steps. The first proves the Born rule in the
context of symmetric superpositions whose amplitudes are evenly distributed (e.g. when spin-
up is assigned 0.5 probability). The second step proves the Born rule for unequally weighted
superpositions (e.g. when spin-up is assigned 0.7 probability).9 It is in this second step that
both McQueen and Vaidman, and Sebens and Carroll, appeal to locality-based axioms.
McQueen and Vaidman (2019, p19; 2020) appeal to local supervenience: whatever happens
in region A depends on the quantum state of this region and its immediate vicinity. Here, the
quantum state of a region is defined by its reduced density operator. Under this assumption,
local supervenience may well be true. But it does not follow that local causality is satisfied, as
argued in Sec. 6. Still, the weaker no-signaling principle would be sufficient in place of local
supervenience. Indeed, McQueen and Vaidman (2019, Sec. 4.1.) first present a proof of the Born
rule in dynamical collapse theories, where the second step appeals to relativistic no-signalling,
before arguing that a structurally similar proof is available for semi-local branching models.
Sebens and Carroll (2016, p16), in their crucial second step, appeal to an epistemic constraint
on probability assignments (credences). The epistemic separability principle (ESP) states that
the credence one should assign to being any one of several observers having identical experiences
is independent of the state of the environment. Sebens and Carroll think ESP has intuitive
appeal. McQueen and Vaidman (2019, pp.22-3) worry that it is unclear why we should believe
ESP in a model that allows global branching. The present analysis allows us to raise the concern
more directly: why should one’s credences only be constrained by the facts of one’s local region
in a model that is not truly local? Until this question is answered, it seems that Sebens and
Carroll’s proof does not have a solid foundation.
Finally, local worlds models provide a straightforward explanation of the Born rule. As
discussed, there are many numerically distinct but qualitatively identical copies of Alice before
the measurement. Any given Alice is therefore uncertain about the future, since any given Alice is
uncertain whether she is an Alice that will see spin-up. It therefore makes sense for her to assign
probabilities to future outcomes. Furthermore, when Alice measures her spin, the proportion of
her world-lines which experience each outcome is stipulated to match the Born rule predictions.
There is therefore no need for any additional proof of the Born rule.10
9This two-step structure is apparent in Wallace (2012, p173). Wallace’s second step relies on the “branching
indifference” principle, which is critically analysed in Dizadji-Bahmani (2015).
10See Albert (1992, p130) for a similar explanation of the Born rule in the context of a many minds interpretation
of quantum mechanics.
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8.2 Other interpretations
The reformulated version of Bell’s theorem is a which-way theorem, in the sense that any empir-
ically consisitent physical theory must violate at least one axiom of the theorem. This makes it
a useful tool for categorizing the various interpretations of quantum mechanics, and we attempt
this here for a number of well-known interpretations. It seems inevitable that some proponents
of these models will disagree with our assessments, but we have endeavored to be as fair and
open-minded as possible in the following discussion.
To begin with a recapitulation of this paper, we have proved that all interpretations of
quantum mechanics which include a universal wavefunction violate local causality. This includes
various Copenhagen-ish interpretations, Bohmian mechanics, and dynamical collapse models, all
of which obey the no superdeterminism and one world axioms.
The consistent (or decoherent) histories interpretation of Griffiths (2003) also seems to follow
a universal wavefunction, meaning it violates local causality, but the details are hard to pin
down. According to Gell-Mann and Hartle (2012) it obeys the one world axiom, even if this
world cannot be directly observed, but because the model refuses to consider counterfactual
questions, it also seems to deny no superdeterminism.
All of the many worlds models we have discussed (except local worlds) also violate local
causality because of the universal wavefunction, and they all violate the one world axiom by
definition. Most many worlds models obey no superdeterminsm.
Retrocausal interpretations like those of Price and Wharton (2015) and Aharonov, Bergmann,
and Lebowitz (1964) violate no superdeterminism, since elements of reality exist only for observ-
ables that will be measured in the future, and not for all observables. These models both obey
the one world axiom, and Price and Wharton obey local causality while Aharanov et al. seem
willing to give it up.
The case of QBism from Fuchs, Mermin, and Schack (2014) is a little harder to pin down, but
like other Copenhagen-ish models, it seems that most of its proponents think it should obey the
no superdeterminism and one world axioms, meaning that it must violate local causality. On the
other hand, QBists do assert that their theory is local. As they say, “QBist quantum mechanics
is local because its entire purpose is to enable any single agent to organize her own degrees of
belief about the contents of her own personal experience. No agent can move faster than light:
the space-time trajectory of any agent is necessarily timelike. Her personal experience takes place
along that trajectory.” However, the question of locality is not a question of personal experience,
it is a question of physical ontology. But a physical ontology is something that QBists have yet
to provide.
Interestingly, the local worlds model can almost be seen as a version of QBism that provides
a physical ontology, wherein one world is violated instead of local causality ; for local worlds
models agree that each individual agent moves along their own world-line – it’s just that agents
are treated no differently than any other physical system. Furthermore, local worlds models
agree that the universal wavefunction does not compose the ontology, but that each agent may
have their own personal wavefunction, which they use to predict their future experiences.
Local worlds is also similar to Rovelli’s (1996) relational interpretation of quantum mechanics,
which also denies a single universal wavefunction. Relational quantum mechanics is also intended
to obey local causality and no superdeterminism, in which case our proof shows that it must be
a local many worlds model. Their key disagreement on this point seems to stem from their
apparent denial that space-like separation is an objective fact about two objects, but without
this, they would appear to have no coherent definition of locality (Smerlak and Rovelli 2007,
Martin-Dussaud et. al. 2019, cf. Pienaar 2018).
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9 Conclusions
The main objective of this paper was to generalize and formalize both the explicit and implicit
axioms of EPR (1935) and Bell (1964) in the pursuit of a truly local quantum theory. From
there, we examined a number of existing many worlds models. We found that none of them are
truly local, with the exception of local many worlds models.
The fact that N -particle quantum theory is defined in 3N -dimensional configuration space,
and not in 3-space, was seen as deeply troubling by Schro¨dinger, Einstein, Lorentz, and many
others (Norsen 2017, pp. 118-120), partly because it seemed to make the theory nonlocal. Here we
have proved that a universal wavefunction in configuration space cannot belong to the ontology
of any truly local model, which validates their intuition.
Local many worlds is also the first quantum theory (that we know of) that is truly local, and
where all the physics is Lorentz invariant and exists in space-time (note that even relativistic
field theories handle entanglement using a universal wavefunction in configuration space).
Of course, as we have discussed, there are a number of other self-consistent interpretations of
quantum mechanics which are not truly local and keep the universal wavefunction as part of their
ontology. It therefore remains possible that the wavefunction will prove to be a necessary part of
the correct quantum theory. The purpose of this paper is not to advocate for one interpretation
over another, but to establish a clear framework in which any interpretation can be impartially
analyzed, and to apply that analysis to several models in order to elucidate their inner workings
and highlight their differences.
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